It is rather shocking that anyone would think aiding warlords in a country riddled with conflict would actually be a good idea, of benefit to the country in turmoil or the greater global community, but time and again we have seen the United States and other nations siding their interests with warlords and rebel groups. Kimberly Marten writes that anything resembling a state is preferable to rule by warlords, whose very presence is a huge obstacle to development. She writes of the conditions that lead to the emergence of “warlordism,” its destructive impact on societies, and the conditions needed to end it.
Marten defines warlords as: 1) trained, armed men who seize control of small territories in the absence of central authority; 2) whose actions are based on their own self-interest and not ideology; 3) whose authority is based on charisma and patronage; and 4) whose personalistic rule leads to segmentation of the political and economic arrangements across the country (Marten, 48). It is worth nothing that Marten's second condition, acting based on their own self-interest, is also an issue raised in Collier, who notes that rebel movements often use ideology or appeals to national identity as a smokescreen for their own greed. One might hope that governments would look more towards the actions of warlords rather than their rhetoric when deciding to side with or support them, but here again history has proven us wrong.
Warlords take over some of the functions of a state, often taking for themselves what Weber has described as the purvue of a state: “the claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory (Marten, 43).”
Marten notes that in some cases warlords actually do provide for the people living within the territory they rule, but when they do it is with the goal of keeping their armies full of recruits and the population more or less complacent (Marten, 47). For the few benefits warlords can provide—some measure of stability and goods if a government can not provide for its citizens—their impact on an economy is destructive. By raising transaction costs between regions and/or expropriating natural resources for their own gain, warlords inhibit economic growth. Marten writes that one of the main conditions for the overthrow of warlords is a group of people who organize around the protection of their economic interests.
Lack of public services is not the only reason that warlords can emerge. Marten writes that countries with large landmass and spread out populations are more vulnerable than smaller countries or those with high urban concentrations. A dispersed population makes organizing to overthrow warlords harder and less likely, as does a high level of illiteracy (Marten, 70). I found this last point noteworthy, since it illustrates how few public benefits warlords actually provide to the people in the regions they rule. Despite lending a measure of stability and services that might be lacking in the absence of a strong central government, warlords rarely concern themselves with the long-term benefit of society, evidenced in this example by the lack of investment in education. Keeping a population illiterate may help to keep them ignorant of their rights or the ability to effectively organize, but it also has the side effect of slowing economic growth (Marten, 69). Power is tenuous, and one who comes to power through force or coercion, as warlords often do, no doubt realize that they too can be easily displaced, so best to get what they can while then can.
Marten looks at warlords and their demise in the histories of medieval Europe, China, and a brief period in Japan before she turns her attention to contemporary warlord states in Somalia and Afghanistan. Using history as a guide, she looks at the conditions in both countries to see whether conditions exist for them to move beyond warlordism. For Somalia, Marten sees a glimmer of hope, but Afghanistan's fate does not look as promising.
Somalia's hope is in its diaspora, Marten asserts. With no central state in Somalia and no public services, formal education has become nonexistent. Marten believes that Somali ex patriots living in developed nations of the West would have the education necessary to promote change at home, in addition to some funds from their jobs abroad. In addition, technology is in Somalia's favor. The country has a strong network of mobile phones, connecting those within Somalia's borders to each other and family living abroad (Marten, 69). Looking back at the fall of warlords in China and Europe, Marten points to the discovery or rediscovery of alternative forms of law as a decisive factor (Marten, 59). Through channels such as cell phones (one could also imagine through the Internet, assuming it was available and not censored), these ideas could flow into Somalia, helping to plant the seeds of change.
Afghanistan has few of the positives of even Somalia. Geographically quite isolated, its diaspora exists mostly in neighboring Iran and Pakistan, hardly enlightened democratic states (Marten, 71). The country's population is largely rural, with strong ethnic identities the often override loyalty to a national identity. Little to no infrastructure exists for technology, as it does in Somalia, so the exchange of ideas from outside the country is severely constrained. In addition, some warlords in Afghanistan have been granted an unfortunate measure of credibility by being appointed to high ministerial positions in the fledgling US-backed government of Hamid Karzi. This has two unfortunate consequences: 1) it encourages warlordism by other opportunists who see the rewards that come from wielding power over small territories and 2) for those who have suffered at the hands of these warlords, it further cements their distrust in the new government. Distrust in the central government unfortunately only leads people to seek out alternative leaders, which in turn breeds more warlords, and the cycle repeats.
I left Marten's piece wondering what the solution is. Yes, we need to promote stronger state governments, but it seems to me that at the root of warlordism is a very short-term world view both within the states in question and leadership in the developed world who rush to realign themselves with the powerful warlord de jour. As we have seen recently, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, siding with a corrupt or brutal leader who seems to be acting in our interests today seems to come back to bite the US and other developed nations in the long term. It also seemed to me that if there was a focus on providing people's basic needs, the warlord would be cut out of the equation. This might mean long-term relief programs that work simultaneously with state building efforts, with the idea of transitioning out as stability increases. Regardless, it requires a long-term view.
My questions for further discussion would be:
- What role does the relief and development community play in cutting warlords out of the equation? And does a role in state building put them at unnecessary risk of not only stretching their mandate but of personal security (acting against a powerful warlord could after all get you killed)?
What role does the diaspora community of a country play in its development, how can that be fostered, and how do we stay conscious of the pitfalls? These people are, after all, not at direct risk of violence to themselves since they live abroad.- How could technology be made more accessible so people within troubled states have more exposure to different ideas of governance and norms?
- Marten talks a lot about the economic incentives behind overthrowing a warlord, but how you can get an economy running without a stable government? Is this a chicken and egg problem, or are there creative ways to promote economic growth around the obstacles of warlords?
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