Xenophobia in South Africa

For my Politics of International Development course this semester, I had to follow one country through various themes and research them for two papers. The first paper was posted in March, on South African state-building and reincorporation of the "homelands" post-apartheid. My last topic, the sorry state of South Africa's refugee processing, dealt a lot with rising xenophobia in the country and the shameful scape-goating of immigrants from the rest of the African continent. Sadly, more and more articles on this issue cropped up every day that I wrote the massive paper. Over the weekend it seems the kettle boiled over.

The NYT reports that over 200 people were arrested in and around Johannesburg over the weekend in one of the country's largest waves of anti-immigrant violence. Twelve people were killed, beaten by sticks, shots, or burned alive.

It would be easy to dismiss this as repressed anger unleased in the face of high unemployment, HIV/AIDS edipemics, massive poverty unresolved after apartheid's fall, etc. But it's not just ordinary people who scapegoat immigrants and refugees from Zimbabwe and other nations--government officals have done their share of blaming, as have government ministries and the police force, which has at times encouraged citizens to assist them in outing illegal immigrants. As a result, people are targeted if they appear "foreign" and a lot of apartheid's racial classifications are rearing their heads again as people judge whether someone looks "too black" to be South African.

I wasn't planning on posting my paper because it was, after all, 20 pages long, but I'm going to post a few excerpts below today for some background:

The Rainbow Nation ends at the fence
The end of apartheid was a literal and figurative end to South Africa's “fortified boundaries.”1 Under apartheid, the electric fence along South Africa's border was set to “lethal” and claimed close to 100 lives of those seeking clandestine entrance into or out of the country.2 Under the new government, the electric fence has been in non-lethal mode, but South Africa's borders are not considered any less threatened by many in its government, media, security forces, and indeed even by some in the South African population.

South Africa has long wrestled with its identity. For a nation where race had determined citizenship, redefining what it meant to be South African was an enormous undertaking. To forge a new national identity, South Africa's leadership referred to its peoples past, invoking their common, if divisive, history.3 Experience of this “divided but shared history is used to identify true 'South Africans'...those who are deemed to stand outside this shared history are excluded from its unifying implications.”4 South Africa also tied its new identity to its national borders. Peberdy writes that “the reinvented nationalism and national identity of the 'new South Africa' is 'derivative' in that it continues to identify with the territorial boundaries and national models of the apartheid state.”5 While simplistic, using recognized borders to define the nation allowed the new government to side-step demands for independent territories by both black and white groups within the country during the handover from the old regime to the ANC.

South Africa has created an image of itself as separate from the rest of Africa. The nation historically felt a certain superiority when compared to its neighbors, not uncommon amongst immigrant-receiving countries, who tend to view the desire of other people to move to their country as stronger than it may be in reality, while viewing their own borders as vulnerable to this onslaught of people fleeing poverty and conflict.6 Some South African websites describe migration to South Africa in almost religious terms: “For many, post-apartheid South Africa has become both an imagined Mecca of economic opportunity, or a haven from war-torn or troubled homelands.”7 Under apartheid black South Africans were denied educational and economic opportunities; nonetheless, the apartheid government played up statistics of black migration to South Africa as proof of apartheid's success and the country's position in comparison to other African nations, promoting a view internally that without tight restrictions on black immigration South Africa would be flooded by the rest of the continent.8 This idea supported the racist views of many of South Africa's white citizens. In also created a xenophobia amongst South Africans at large. The nation is struggling with its promises to deliver greater opportunity and equality for its citizens, and this xenophobia is now proving problematic in the country's dealings with refugees and migrants who are viewed as competing for scarce resources and causing violent crime, economic downturns, and rising HIV infection rates.9

Creating “illegal people”
Regardless of how they enter the nation, South Africa's laws for refugees and migrants, and the practices of their security forces and government institutions charged with processing asylum claims, create a system where attainment of the rights on paper is incredibly difficult. It has been argued that the cause of South Africa's hostility to refugees and migrants is not the sheer number of asylum seekers but is instead that South Africa's ministries tasked with handling asylum applications are simply overwhelmed due to chronic under-staffing and poor training.1 Departments lacking translators and other key staff are overwhelmed with any increase in volume of asylum applications, and may be more apt to deny asylum in order to clear cases off the docket. Indeed, part of UNHCR's recent campaign in South Africa was to train more officials to facilitate the processing of additional asylum claims, but many of those trained soon found work in other, more lucrative, areas.2

South Africa's strict refugee laws have been likened to that of Spain, a European nation on the receiving end of migration from developing countries. Other researchers have argued that Spain's laws “are written in a way to marginalize third world immigrants, to regularize the notion of the 'irregulars.'” Barriers to normal status are constructed through long waits for permits and other restrictions.3 South Africa creates similar hurdles. Its government states that asylum claims can be filed at any of its refugee reception offices.4 However, these offices are all located in the country's major cities, not at its border crossing, and are notorious for long lines that are sometimes patrolled by security forces picking up undocumented migrants.5 These centers also make migrant and refugee populations highly visible and vulnerable to abuse from the community.

Several different departments have interactions with refugees and migrants; the majority of them involve security issues. The South African National Defense Force, the Department of Home Affairs, the South African Police Service (SAPS), and the SAPS Border Policing component all have a role in enforcing South Africa's Alien Control Act.6 South Africa's laws similarly not only construct the migrant and refugee as “illegal” by their very nature of being in the country without authorization, but South Africa goes one step further by creating a category of “prohibited persons” who, by their nature, are “without legal standing as persons.”7 This language dehumanizes migrants and effectively categories them as criminals, making abused by police, security, and local populations seemingly more justifiable.

Apart from Africa
South Africa's neighbors are some of the world's poorest countries, and with large income disparities between neighbors often comes a flow of documented and undocumented migrants. The cases of the countries on South Africa's borders also test the largely artificial distinction between “refugee” and “economic refugee.” Zimbabwe is one such case. In the past decade, the inflation rate in Zimbabwe has escalated from 32 percent to over 100,000.8 Today, Zimbabweans face not only hyperinflation but unemployment rates of 80%, food shortages, and an increasingly oppressive government.9 Human rights groups within South Africa have warned that Zimbabwe is near collapse.10 Initial asylum claims from people crossing over the South African border were dismissed by the South African authorities, who stated that “Zimbabwe is not at war” and so any claims were invalid.11 At the time of writing, results from Zimbabwe's March 29 election had just been released, with results pointing to a run-off, and reports of violence and persecution against opposition-party members and sympathizers on the rise. A shipment of arms destined for Zimbabwe came under international pressure to return to China, but violence against the political opponents and suspects opponents of President Mugabe has been increasing. According to the BBC: “The defense minister in neighboring Botswana said Zimbabweans were fleeing the violence, with almost 100 people arriving in the past three days. He said in the past, Zimbabweans had been economic migrants but now they were seeking political asylum. There have been similar reports from Mozambique.”12 If one looks to Kunz's theory that refugee migrations are signaled by the early migrations of a few, and then examines the situation in Zimbabwe, it makes little sense to categorize those fleeing Zimbabwe now as legitimate refugees but not those who left earlier in the unraveling of the state.

Numerous human rights abuses have been documented in the arrest and detention of undocumented migrants, refugees, and those suspected of being non-citizens by security forces in South Africa.13 Several human rights NGOs have also highlighted growing abuse of asylum seekers.14 These abuses include frightening parallels to apartheid's police state. Police have used “irrational standards to determine whether individuals are 'illegal immigrants,' including skin color and location of vaccination marks.”15 People report being stopped and interrogated based on perceptions of their race or nationality due to “texture of hair and breadth of nose.”16 This has led to persecutions of naturalized South Africans by police forces who have determined them to fit one of their arbitrary conditions, a troubling allusion to apartheid's pass laws when black South Africans could be stopped and forced to produce their papers.17 Such actions now violate South Africa's Bill of Rights and the right to privacy of all its citizens.18

Host governments of refugee populations often argue that refugees “present serious economic, environmental, and security threats, and that they can no longer keep their borders open.”19 Over 50% of South Africans still live in poverty,20 and despite an end to formal segregation and discrimination, the majority of the country's wealth still resides with its non-black population. These economic disparities contribute to the scape-goating of migrants and refugees. Maharaj writes that “xenophobia is rife in the townships, where migrants are referred to as kwerekwere (disparaging word for African immigrant). It has been argued that xenophobia thrives where economic deprivation and hardships are acute.”21 Regarding its treatment of Mozambican refugees, even UNHCR criticized South African xenophobia.22 In recognition of the problem in South Africa, national ministries, working with UNHCR, launched a campaign against xenophobia in the country in 2000.23 Even as of last month, South Africa's government offices were still taking steps to address the issue.24 It is a sign of progress that the government seems acutely, and uncomfortably, aware of negative perceptions of its treatment of asylum seekers.25 How the government chooses to continue to address the problem will be illustrative.

1Jeff Handmaker. (2001) No Easy Walk: Advancing Refugee Protection in South Africa . Africa Today, Vol. 48, No.3, pp.98
2UNHCR. (2005) UNHCR Global Reports: South Africa. Retrieved on May 3, 2008 from http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/4492678e0.pdf
3Jonathan Klaaren; Jaya Ramji. (2001) Inside Illegality: Migration Policing in South Africa after Apartheid. Africa Today, Vol. 48, No.3, pp.39
4South Africa Department of Home Affairs. Directorate: Home Affairs. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 from http://www.home-affairs.gov.za/refugee_affairs.asp#3
5Refugees International. (2004) Zimbabweans in South Africa: denied access to political asylum. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 from http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/3012
6Jonathan Klaaren; Jaya Ramji, pp.40
7Ibid.
8CIA World Factbook. (2007) Zimbabwe. Retrieved on May 1, 2008 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html
9J. Anthony Holmes; Sasha Polakow-Suransky. (April 17, 2008) The Silence of Mbeki. The International Herald Tribune. Retrieved on April 21, 2008 from www.cfr.org/publication/16059/silence_of_mbeki.html
10Zimbabwe Standard (November 26, 2007) Zimbabwe: AU Probes Abuses of Refugees. Retrieved on February 6, 2008 from http://allafrica.com/stories/200711261669.html
11Human Rights Watch (2006) Uprooted Migrants: Zimbabweans in South Africa's Limpopo Province. Retrieved on February 7, 2008 from http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/southafrica0806/
12BBC News. (May 2, 2008) Zimbabwe announces poll results. Retrived on May 2, 2008 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7382319.stm
13Klaaren; Ramij, pp.35
14U.S. Committee for Refugees and Migrants (2007) World Refugee Survey. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 from http://refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?subm=&ssm=&cid=2020
15Klaaren; Ramij, pp.43
16Maharaj, pp.52 See also Peberdy, pp.21
17Peberdy, pp. 21
18Southern Africa Migration Project. (2001) The South African White Paper on International Migration: an analysis and critique. Migration & Policy Brief No.1, pp.10. Retrieved on April 14, 2001 from http://www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/samppublications.
19Karen Jacobsen (2002). Can Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee resources and African statebuilding. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 40, No.4, pp.579
20CIA World Factbook (2007) South Africa. Retrieved on May 1, 2008 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html#Econ
21Maharaj, pp.51
22Klotz, pp.833
23Humanitarian Practice Network (2008) “We are not treated like people: the roll-back xenophobia campaign in South Africa.” Retrieved on May 5, 2008 from http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2208
24South Africa Department of Home Affairs (2008) Deputy Minister to hold a discussion with youth immigrants/Refugees and stakeholders in Pretoria. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 from http://www.home-affairs.gov.za/media_releases.asp?id=467
25South Africa Department of Home Affairs (2008) Press release, Refugee Day remarks by President Mbeki. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 from http://www.home-affairs.gov.za/documents/refugee_article.pdf

Diary of an Overachiever?

It occurs to me that I don't write about myself...well, ever, really...and given that it is going to be a lazy, reflective kind of Sunday around here it seems a good enough time.

The past few weeks have been really busy. Wrapping up final projects--20 page paper in 2 weeks? Statistical analysis and two exams to boot?--oh, and client budget reprojections due the same day at Stats final, and really, why not sign up for that 6.2 mile race while you're at it? But the day before the race make sure you are the only volunteer who agrees to stand out in the pouring rain and wind at the animal adoption event trying to get folks off the street to come in and meet the cats, cook dinner with your 4 girlfriends, and go to a board advisory council meeting for a small non-profit in the city. All of which has been crammed into the last 2 weeks alone. I just *do* all this stuff, and it doesn't feel like "overachieving" because I honestly love doing all of it.

A friend of mine often calls me an overachiever, joking in part because he's somewhat the same way himself, and to be honest I've never quite known what to make of that. I always think of overachievers as people who wear their accomplishments on their sleeves and won't ever shut up about their Harvard GPA, work in Guatemala, or whatever. And I don't think I've ever really been like that. I always wonder if those boasting people do what they do just so they can brag about it or because they really enjoy it.

I think some people get energy from the things they do, and others lose energy from it, and we all handle it our own way. Which is not to say that I don't need copious amounts of quiet time to recharge or that I don't run myself into the ground sometimes, but in the process it's a great time. I am ambitious and I do have very high standards for myself. Maybe I cram it all in because I want to advance faster, or maybe it's just because the more things on my plate the more I seem to thrive on it. I'm not sure, but regardless I don't like the overachiever badge very much.

The next three weeks are a little more on the downtime scale for me: hiking out west first week of June, then my birthday, then off to Geneva and Amsterdam for summer courses and then it's July. I'm in the full job-search mode at the moment, and I hope when I come back from hiking there will be some promising interviews waiting. In the meantime, I'll keep running and volunteering and have a million other little projects going because, in the end, I'm creating my life the way I want to, and there's a certain joy to that.

Commentary

My Op-Ed on reducing maternal mortality and achieving the heart of the MDGs is published today on RH Reality Check. Check it out here.

I spend a lot of time at the Union Square Farmer's Market, and I recently started serving on the advisory council of a group called Just Food that helps connect farmers with community supported agriculture programs, supplies farm-fresh produce to food banks, and advocates for better food policy. So I've definitely noticed that the global food crisis impacts the prices farmers have to charge for their bread; it hits them, too.

My paying an extra dollar for bread is a hassle but not a hardship. Most of the world lives on less than $2 a day. We all know this by now, right? So an increase in commodities hits them hard. Families have to decide between one meal or two, or maybe even who doesn't eat a meal altogether. And when someone has to go hungry, most often it is a woman or girl in the family.

The NYT piece on food security and overall security in Afghanistan got me worried today. Here is a nation that really doesn't need any more instability or another event to shake up an already fragile state. This is also the perfect environment for breeding warlordism: if the government shows it can not provide food, someone else will step in who can, even if they have to use force. Which is really how Afghanistan's warlord problem started in the first place.

It is hard to imagine a lasting stability in Afghanistan, or anywhere, if the country does not have the means to feed itself, whether growing its own crops or paying for food imports. Afghanistan relies heavily on international aid; the donor community needs to do better to address this pressing need.

Countdown

One final behind me, two more to go. Well, three. I have a big ol' paper due tonight, an exam tomorrow morning, and a project due in a week. All of which I feel, strangely, are under control. I've been somewhat laser-focused on getting all these things reined in after a few moments of panic two weeks ago and it seems to be working.

I have been mentally compiling a list of all things I plan to do once the finals are behind me, and I figured I'd actually take a minute to write it down.

1. First, buy some trashy magazines with no information on the following: finance, statistics, international development, foreign policy, humanitarianism, or aid
2. Pick up the sweater I started knitting a year ago and attempt to make some progress on it
3. Go out with my friends
4. Take a long aimless walk around the city

That's the fun stuff. The rest is just a list of things to do, like buy clothing for an upcoming hiking trip and finish up some work projects before said hiking trip.

Send good karma for the remaining finals...

Getting to the root of the MDGs

Reducing maternal mortality will require tackling the politics of reproductive health
Promoting women's health holds the key to development. Two years ago, Kofi Annan, then Secretary General of the United Nations, stated: “The Millennium Development Goals, particularly the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, cannot be achieved if questions of population and reproductive health are not squarely addressed. And this means stronger efforts to promote women's rights and greater investment in education and health, including reproductive health and family planning.”

Millennium Development Goal #5, reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters by 2015, has been called the heart of the MDGs. High levels of maternal mortality are linked to a chain of negative consequences, including decreases in infant survival and education and increases in poverty. With attainment of many of the MDGs already in jeopardy, reducing maternal mortality has become all the more urgent. Reducing maternal mortality needs not only the provision of more and better pre-and ante-natal care but also comprehensive reproductive health services—including safe abortion. Unless the politics of reproductive health and abortion are confronted head-on, MDG#5 and its accompanying targets may remain only a goal, and not reality, for millions of women in the developing world.

Maternal mortality is a phenomena largely confined to the developing world, with 99% of maternal deaths—over half a million women per year—concentrated in low income countries. While hemorrhage, eclampsia, sepsis, and obstructed labor account for many maternal deaths, the most easily prevented of the top maternal death culprits, unsafe abortion, remains a political, rather than health, issue in most of the world. The World Health Organization estimates that almost 13% of all maternal deaths are caused by complications from unsafe abortions.
Reducing maternal deaths from unsafe abortion is one of the most straight-forward public health problems to remedy. It requires increases in access to safe abortion and contraceptives. It is well-documented that countries with the lowest rates of abortion are those with the greatest access to legal abortion services and contraceptives. According to the Guttmacher Institute, a reproductive rights research center, Belgium, where abortion is legal and accessible, has an abortion rate of 7 per 100,000 women. Contrast this to Peru, where the procedure is illegal, and the rate skyrockets to 56 per 100,000. Despite the evidence, reproductive health targets were not initially included in the MDGs. These targets came late to the process in 2006--almost half way to the end date of the campaign—and were added under the goal of reducing maternal mortality only after significant pressure from UN member states, including members of the EU and several developing nations such as Cambodia, Cuba, Madagascar, and Nigeria.

MDG subgoal 5B sets out to have universal access to reproductive health by 2015. Unlike other MDG's, reducing maternal mortality and achieving universal access to reproductive heath care will take more than technical expertise and material resources. Reducing maternal mortality, unsafe abortion, and increasing access to reproductive health care requires that governments, societies, and donors confront not only the issue of abortion but also medically-accurate sex education for women and girls and access to contraceptives. These measures alone would decrease by 90% incidents of unsafe abortion—and go a long way to reducing maternal mortality.

Abortion is a reality of many women's reproductive lives. The underlying political gap is standing in the way of women's access to comprehensive reproductive health care. Without added pressure from donor governments, local women's health advocates in the developing world can only do so much to stop deaths from unsafe abortions in their countries. Donors who place restrictions on reproductive health funding, such as the United States which prohibits any organization accepting these funds from offering abortion as part of their comprehensive reproductive health care programs, do so at the peril of women's lives. Other developed nations, such as Great Britain and EU members, have made a commitment to unrestricting their reproductive health funding.

Reducing maternal deaths is a laudable goal, and one that must be achieved if the rest of the millennium development goals are to be realized. But reductions in maternal mortality can never be fully realized unless the global community of donors, governments, and public health starts including abortion in realistic approaches to protecting women's health. If the world wants to promote development, it needs to start promoting comprehensive reproductive health care.