Wow! The nurses accused by the Libyan government of intentionally infecting children with HIV have been released after years of imprisonment. Read the full story on the NYT website.
Tuesday, July 24, 2007
Friday, July 20, 2007
Water, Water Everywhere...
....but not a drop to drink.
This old rhyme would be cute if only it weren't true.
Over the past weekend I read three separate articles on water, appearing in Fast Company, Good, and the Sunday NYT Week in Review. It would appear that some people in the philanthropic communities are starting to realize that water safety and access lies at the heart of many other public health and development issues.
Don't have access to clean water? Then your wife or daughter can walk 4 hours roundtrip to collect it. If there's water to be collected. She can't start a small business to earn extra money, and she can't go to school because collecting water takes so much time. She might face assault on her way to the water source. But someone has to collect the water.
You walked 4 hours to collect water, so you don't want it wasted. So you don't wash your vegetables, or yourself, as often as you'd like because water is precious and your family needs it. You get skin problems; your child has diarrhea. Lots of children in your town have died from diarrhea--and you've seen worse caused by the water.
In the interest of full disclosure, I'm doing some work for a water org now and learning more about all these issues that intersect with water. In a previous life and org we did work with water but in an emergency relief context. I have to admit it's shocking to see just how bad these issues are even in stable, if extremely poor, countries.
More to come...
This old rhyme would be cute if only it weren't true.
Over the past weekend I read three separate articles on water, appearing in Fast Company, Good, and the Sunday NYT Week in Review. It would appear that some people in the philanthropic communities are starting to realize that water safety and access lies at the heart of many other public health and development issues.
Don't have access to clean water? Then your wife or daughter can walk 4 hours roundtrip to collect it. If there's water to be collected. She can't start a small business to earn extra money, and she can't go to school because collecting water takes so much time. She might face assault on her way to the water source. But someone has to collect the water.
You walked 4 hours to collect water, so you don't want it wasted. So you don't wash your vegetables, or yourself, as often as you'd like because water is precious and your family needs it. You get skin problems; your child has diarrhea. Lots of children in your town have died from diarrhea--and you've seen worse caused by the water.
In the interest of full disclosure, I'm doing some work for a water org now and learning more about all these issues that intersect with water. In a previous life and org we did work with water but in an emergency relief context. I have to admit it's shocking to see just how bad these issues are even in stable, if extremely poor, countries.
More to come...
Follow the Money
Part 4 of 5
U.S. Policy in Colombia: The Money Trail
Economically, geographically, and politically important, Colombia has been and continues to be the focus of U.S. policy in the Southern hemisphere. The U.S. Department of State reports that the U.S. represents the largest source of foreign direct investment in Colombia, and last year Colombia was the fifth largest export market in the Western Hemisphere for U.S. goods. The country has natural resources of interest to the U.S., including modest stores of petroleum and natural gas and represents one of the more stable economies in its region.1
Current U.S. foreign policy continues to focus on the war on drugs and assisting the Colombian government's counter-insurgency efforts. Since 2000, the U.S. has spent close to $3 billion in
Colombia, of which 75% was directed towards military and policy assistance.2 For fiscal year 2007, the Congressional Budget and Justification for Foreign Operations listed a request of $78 million for foreign military training (FMT) in Colombia, and $1.68 million for International Military Education and Training, the part of their work that encompasses the “human rights” part of military work.3 The Center for International Policy reports these figures at $90 million and $1.68 million, respectively.4 However, these two figures represent a very small part of the total military spending package for Colombia. For FY07, International Narcotics Control was projected at $366.55 million, and “Section 1033” Defense Department counter-narcotics programs were projected at $122 million. When all budget lines are added, the total is $584.44 million.5 Comparatively, in 2004 USAID spent an estimated additional $122 million in humanitarian aid directed to Colombia through non-governmental programs.6
The amount of money directed at counter-narcotics and other military programs in Colombia—coupled with the country's human rights record—has not escaped the scrutiny of Congress. The Leahy Provision prohibits military aid from being sent to foreign military units accused of human rights violations until reports show redress of grievances to the satisfaction of Congress.7 Congress has gone so far as to include specific human rights provisions specific to Colombia when funding for military operations for that country were increased. Under the Leahy Provision, funds have been withheld from Colombia in the past, but the executive branch has the power to sign a waiver to override Congress. One such instance of the use of a waiver for Colombia occurred in 2000 by then-President Clinton. Human Rights Watch contends that by signing the waiver the White House “sent a message to Colombia's leaders that overshadowed any other related to human rights...that as long as the Colombian military cooperated with the U.S. anti-drug strategy, American officials would waive human rights conditions and skirt their own human rights laws.”8
International foreign policy, and with it military spending, are not immune from domestic politicking and, in an age of globalization, nor should it be. In addition to the power of the purse Congress has through the Leahy Provision and other measures, a current bill before Congress would move to have the U.S. take an active role in ending the use of child soldiers. Senate Bill 1175, the 'Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2007' a bi-partisan bill presented in April of this year, states that Congress believes “that the United States Government should support and, where practicable, lead efforts to establish and uphold international standards designed to end this abuse of human rights...expand ongoing services to rehabilitate child soldiers...work with the international community...on efforts to bring to justice rebel organizations that kidnap children for use as child soldiers, such as the FARC.”9 In addition the bill calls on State and Defense to coordinate on programs to end the use of child soldiers and that no military funding or training be made available to countries known by the Department of State or Defense to use child soldiers. Many of the provisions in the bill echo the language of the Leahy Provision, but the bill notably requires that foreign officers of the State Department be trained on matters pertaining to child soldiers.
1United States Department of State, “Background Note: Colombia,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm. Last accessed July 1, 2007.
2 Sweig, Julia E, “Challenges for U.S. Policy Toward Colombia: Is Plan Colombia Working—the Regional Dimensions?”, Testimony to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 29, 2003, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.orf/publication/6511/challenges_for_US_policy_toward_colombia.html. Last accessed June 22, 2007.
3United States Department of State, FY07 Congressional Budget and Justification for Foreign Operations, www.state.gov/documents/organization/60656.pdf. Last accessed June 25, 2007.
4Center for International Policy, “Just the Facts: A civilian's guide to U.S. defense and security assistance to Latin America and the Carribean,” www.ciponline.org/facts/co.htm, June 25, 2007
5Center for International Policy, “Just the Facts: A civilian's guide to U.S. defense and security assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean,” www.ciponline.org/facts/co.htm
6United States Agency for International Development, “Colombia: Overview,” http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/country/colombia/. Last accessed June 30, 2007.
7 Human Rights Watch, “Sixth Division,” hrw.org/reports/2001/colombia/6theng.pdf. Last accessed June 26, 2007, 4
8Ibid
9 United States Senate, “S.1175, Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2007,” The Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c110:./temp/~c110K3DOWe,. Last accessed May 30, 2007.
U.S. Policy in Colombia: The Money Trail
Economically, geographically, and politically important, Colombia has been and continues to be the focus of U.S. policy in the Southern hemisphere. The U.S. Department of State reports that the U.S. represents the largest source of foreign direct investment in Colombia, and last year Colombia was the fifth largest export market in the Western Hemisphere for U.S. goods. The country has natural resources of interest to the U.S., including modest stores of petroleum and natural gas and represents one of the more stable economies in its region.1
Current U.S. foreign policy continues to focus on the war on drugs and assisting the Colombian government's counter-insurgency efforts. Since 2000, the U.S. has spent close to $3 billion in
Colombia, of which 75% was directed towards military and policy assistance.2 For fiscal year 2007, the Congressional Budget and Justification for Foreign Operations listed a request of $78 million for foreign military training (FMT) in Colombia, and $1.68 million for International Military Education and Training, the part of their work that encompasses the “human rights” part of military work.3 The Center for International Policy reports these figures at $90 million and $1.68 million, respectively.4 However, these two figures represent a very small part of the total military spending package for Colombia. For FY07, International Narcotics Control was projected at $366.55 million, and “Section 1033” Defense Department counter-narcotics programs were projected at $122 million. When all budget lines are added, the total is $584.44 million.5 Comparatively, in 2004 USAID spent an estimated additional $122 million in humanitarian aid directed to Colombia through non-governmental programs.6
The amount of money directed at counter-narcotics and other military programs in Colombia—coupled with the country's human rights record—has not escaped the scrutiny of Congress. The Leahy Provision prohibits military aid from being sent to foreign military units accused of human rights violations until reports show redress of grievances to the satisfaction of Congress.7 Congress has gone so far as to include specific human rights provisions specific to Colombia when funding for military operations for that country were increased. Under the Leahy Provision, funds have been withheld from Colombia in the past, but the executive branch has the power to sign a waiver to override Congress. One such instance of the use of a waiver for Colombia occurred in 2000 by then-President Clinton. Human Rights Watch contends that by signing the waiver the White House “sent a message to Colombia's leaders that overshadowed any other related to human rights...that as long as the Colombian military cooperated with the U.S. anti-drug strategy, American officials would waive human rights conditions and skirt their own human rights laws.”8
International foreign policy, and with it military spending, are not immune from domestic politicking and, in an age of globalization, nor should it be. In addition to the power of the purse Congress has through the Leahy Provision and other measures, a current bill before Congress would move to have the U.S. take an active role in ending the use of child soldiers. Senate Bill 1175, the 'Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2007' a bi-partisan bill presented in April of this year, states that Congress believes “that the United States Government should support and, where practicable, lead efforts to establish and uphold international standards designed to end this abuse of human rights...expand ongoing services to rehabilitate child soldiers...work with the international community...on efforts to bring to justice rebel organizations that kidnap children for use as child soldiers, such as the FARC.”9 In addition the bill calls on State and Defense to coordinate on programs to end the use of child soldiers and that no military funding or training be made available to countries known by the Department of State or Defense to use child soldiers. Many of the provisions in the bill echo the language of the Leahy Provision, but the bill notably requires that foreign officers of the State Department be trained on matters pertaining to child soldiers.
1United States Department of State, “Background Note: Colombia,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm. Last accessed July 1, 2007.
2 Sweig, Julia E, “Challenges for U.S. Policy Toward Colombia: Is Plan Colombia Working—the Regional Dimensions?”, Testimony to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 29, 2003, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.orf/publication/6511/challenges_for_US_policy_toward_colombia.html. Last accessed June 22, 2007.
3United States Department of State, FY07 Congressional Budget and Justification for Foreign Operations, www.state.gov/documents/organization/60656.pdf. Last accessed June 25, 2007.
4Center for International Policy, “Just the Facts: A civilian's guide to U.S. defense and security assistance to Latin America and the Carribean,” www.ciponline.org/facts/co.htm, June 25, 2007
5Center for International Policy, “Just the Facts: A civilian's guide to U.S. defense and security assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean,” www.ciponline.org/facts/co.htm
6United States Agency for International Development, “Colombia: Overview,” http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/country/colombia/. Last accessed June 30, 2007.
7 Human Rights Watch, “Sixth Division,” hrw.org/reports/2001/colombia/6theng.pdf. Last accessed June 26, 2007, 4
8Ibid
9 United States Senate, “S.1175, Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2007,” The Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c110:./temp/~c110K3DOWe,. Last accessed May 30, 2007.
Sunday, July 8, 2007
No Place for Children: Foreign policy and security rationale for the U.S. to move to end the use of child soldiers in Colombia
Part 3 of 5
Cycles of Violence
Modern warfare ignores the traditional rules of the battlefield. Today, more than 90% of all war casualties are civilian, and children are increasingly not only victims of the violence but direct actors in it.1 As recently as 2001, it was estimated that 300,000 children were participating in armed conflicts around the world, and thousands more were facing recruitment or serving in armed forces not engaged in conflicts.2 The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict bans the involvement and recruitment of children under 18 in armed conflict.3 Despite 110 countries signing onto the Optional Protocol, both state and non-state actors continue to actively recruit and use children under 18 in both formal and non-formal militias. Currently, 20 countries are known to have children fighting in their conflicts; 10 of these have state militias implicated in the use of child soldiers. The United States provides 9 of these states with military assistance, one of which is Colombia.
Colombia has been in the throes of an internal conflict for 40 years. An estimated 1.4 million of the country's 43.3 people are internally displaced within Colombia itself, while hundreds of thousands more have fled to neighboring countries.4 The vast majority of children engaged in Colombia's conflict serve in two guerrilla organizations. Colombia's largest and oldest guerrilla group, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) began in the late 1960's in response to a U.S.-sponsored attack on a Communist-inspired peasant cooperative in the southern Tomila department.5 Today FARC also has the dubious distinction of being the largest guerrilla group in the southern hemisphere, financing itself through kidnapping and ransom, extortion, and the drug trade. National Liberation Army (ELN), the other main guerrilla group, is significantly smaller than FARC. It primarily targets the oil sector and energy infrastructures in its attacks. Finally, United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) is the largest paramilitary organization in the country. Though groups like the AUC were declared illegal in Colombia in 1989, funded by the drug trade and support of wealthy landowners, AUC is known for close and open collaboration with Colombia's official armed forces.6
Human Rights Watch reports that “in the debate over U.S. policy in Colombia, the recruitment of children by Colombia's illegal armed groups has been a secondary issue. Concern has focused more intensely on the Colombian military's tolerance and complicity in other grave (human rights) abuses.”7 Previously, the Colombian government and official armed forces were also actively recruiting and using child soldiers. In recent years the Colombian government has made some good faith efforts to end the use and recruitment of child soldiers within its own forces. In 1991, Colombia signed the Optional Protocol, although it has not yet been ratified. In 1997, documentation showed more than 15,000 children serving as soldiers in Colombia's government forces. Two years later the Colombian government demobilized 800 under 18-year-olds from government forces. While there are no current credible reports of children serving in Colombian government forces, there have been reports of the use of children as spies and informers by police and army units. In addition, the government has offered financial incentives for minors to become “peasant soldiers”, a scheme launched by the government at the end of 2002 to build a peasant army of 20,000.8
The phenomena of child soldiers in Colombia is a reflection of deep-rooted poverty and instability due to years of conflict. While some children are abducted into service, others, with few options for either security or sustenance, join militias out of desperation.9 The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research writes that “the lines between compulsory, voluntary, and forced recruitment are often blurred.” Once in service, child soldiers in Colombia are not protected from the horrors of combat. Human Rights Watch, in an interview with demobilized child soldiers in Colombia, found that children not only fought but also participated in human rights crimes such as torture, assassinations, and executions of non-military actors. Despite some efforts being made by the Colombian government to reintegrate demobilized child soldiers, the lack of an overall campaign to end the practice amounts to a failure to protect the human rights of these children on the part of the Colombian government.10
The lasting effect of child soldiering is recognized in the Optional Protocol, and states that agree to its terms are “disturbed by the harmful and widespread impact of armed conflict on children and the long-term consequences it has for durable peace, security and development.”11 Effects to children include physical and emotional scarring, disrupted psychological development, violent tendencies when removed from the conflict setting, and a lack of any peacetime skills.12 The impact is not confined within a country's borders. One need only to look to contemporary situations such as the recent fighting in Liberia to see militarizing children endangers the stability of entire regions. While it has been argued by some states that recruiting and using minors in armed service could be necessary for national security, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research counters this claim in a report, stating that “the effects of armed conflict on children are devastating, not only for children themselves but for their societies.”13 Singer writes that “a particularly pernicious characteristic of child soldiering is the potential to ruin the lives of children and, in doing so, lay the groundwork for future conflict.”14 According to the CIA World Factbook, almost 30% of Colombia's population is under the age of 1415--a substantial population that could be the future hope or the future fighters of their country.
1 McManimom, Shannon and Stohl, Rachel. 2001. “Use of Children as Soldiers.” Foreign Policy in Focus, Vol. 6. , 1
2Ibid
3Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,” http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/protocolchild.htm. Last accessed July 5, 2007.
4 United States Agency for International Development, “Latin America and the Caribbean: Colombia Overview,” http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/country/colombia/, June 30, 2007.
5Center for International Policy, “Colombia Program,” www.ciponline.org//colombia/infocombat.htm. Last accessed June 12, 2007.
6Ibid
7 Human Rights Watch, “You'll Learn Not to Cry: Child Combatants in Colombia,” hrw.org/reports/2003/colombia0903.html, June 22, 2007, 21
8Ibid, 25
9Ibid, 20
10Ibid
11Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.”
12Singer, P.W. “Addressing the Global Challenge of Child Soldiers,” Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, www.dcaf.ch/_docs/Yearbook2005/Chapter6.prf, 117. Last accessed July 5, 2007.
13 Alfreson, Lisa, “Child Soldiers, Displacement and Human Security,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf_art1728.pdf, June 22, 2007.
14Singer, 119
15 Central Intelligence Agency, “Colombia,” The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html, June 26, 2007
Cycles of Violence
Modern warfare ignores the traditional rules of the battlefield. Today, more than 90% of all war casualties are civilian, and children are increasingly not only victims of the violence but direct actors in it.1 As recently as 2001, it was estimated that 300,000 children were participating in armed conflicts around the world, and thousands more were facing recruitment or serving in armed forces not engaged in conflicts.2 The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict bans the involvement and recruitment of children under 18 in armed conflict.3 Despite 110 countries signing onto the Optional Protocol, both state and non-state actors continue to actively recruit and use children under 18 in both formal and non-formal militias. Currently, 20 countries are known to have children fighting in their conflicts; 10 of these have state militias implicated in the use of child soldiers. The United States provides 9 of these states with military assistance, one of which is Colombia.
Colombia has been in the throes of an internal conflict for 40 years. An estimated 1.4 million of the country's 43.3 people are internally displaced within Colombia itself, while hundreds of thousands more have fled to neighboring countries.4 The vast majority of children engaged in Colombia's conflict serve in two guerrilla organizations. Colombia's largest and oldest guerrilla group, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) began in the late 1960's in response to a U.S.-sponsored attack on a Communist-inspired peasant cooperative in the southern Tomila department.5 Today FARC also has the dubious distinction of being the largest guerrilla group in the southern hemisphere, financing itself through kidnapping and ransom, extortion, and the drug trade. National Liberation Army (ELN), the other main guerrilla group, is significantly smaller than FARC. It primarily targets the oil sector and energy infrastructures in its attacks. Finally, United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) is the largest paramilitary organization in the country. Though groups like the AUC were declared illegal in Colombia in 1989, funded by the drug trade and support of wealthy landowners, AUC is known for close and open collaboration with Colombia's official armed forces.6
Human Rights Watch reports that “in the debate over U.S. policy in Colombia, the recruitment of children by Colombia's illegal armed groups has been a secondary issue. Concern has focused more intensely on the Colombian military's tolerance and complicity in other grave (human rights) abuses.”7 Previously, the Colombian government and official armed forces were also actively recruiting and using child soldiers. In recent years the Colombian government has made some good faith efforts to end the use and recruitment of child soldiers within its own forces. In 1991, Colombia signed the Optional Protocol, although it has not yet been ratified. In 1997, documentation showed more than 15,000 children serving as soldiers in Colombia's government forces. Two years later the Colombian government demobilized 800 under 18-year-olds from government forces. While there are no current credible reports of children serving in Colombian government forces, there have been reports of the use of children as spies and informers by police and army units. In addition, the government has offered financial incentives for minors to become “peasant soldiers”, a scheme launched by the government at the end of 2002 to build a peasant army of 20,000.8
The phenomena of child soldiers in Colombia is a reflection of deep-rooted poverty and instability due to years of conflict. While some children are abducted into service, others, with few options for either security or sustenance, join militias out of desperation.9 The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research writes that “the lines between compulsory, voluntary, and forced recruitment are often blurred.” Once in service, child soldiers in Colombia are not protected from the horrors of combat. Human Rights Watch, in an interview with demobilized child soldiers in Colombia, found that children not only fought but also participated in human rights crimes such as torture, assassinations, and executions of non-military actors. Despite some efforts being made by the Colombian government to reintegrate demobilized child soldiers, the lack of an overall campaign to end the practice amounts to a failure to protect the human rights of these children on the part of the Colombian government.10
The lasting effect of child soldiering is recognized in the Optional Protocol, and states that agree to its terms are “disturbed by the harmful and widespread impact of armed conflict on children and the long-term consequences it has for durable peace, security and development.”11 Effects to children include physical and emotional scarring, disrupted psychological development, violent tendencies when removed from the conflict setting, and a lack of any peacetime skills.12 The impact is not confined within a country's borders. One need only to look to contemporary situations such as the recent fighting in Liberia to see militarizing children endangers the stability of entire regions. While it has been argued by some states that recruiting and using minors in armed service could be necessary for national security, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research counters this claim in a report, stating that “the effects of armed conflict on children are devastating, not only for children themselves but for their societies.”13 Singer writes that “a particularly pernicious characteristic of child soldiering is the potential to ruin the lives of children and, in doing so, lay the groundwork for future conflict.”14 According to the CIA World Factbook, almost 30% of Colombia's population is under the age of 1415--a substantial population that could be the future hope or the future fighters of their country.
1 McManimom, Shannon and Stohl, Rachel. 2001. “Use of Children as Soldiers.” Foreign Policy in Focus, Vol. 6. , 1
2Ibid
3Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,” http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/protocolchild.htm. Last accessed July 5, 2007.
4 United States Agency for International Development, “Latin America and the Caribbean: Colombia Overview,” http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/country/colombia/, June 30, 2007.
5Center for International Policy, “Colombia Program,” www.ciponline.org//colombia/infocombat.htm. Last accessed June 12, 2007.
6Ibid
7 Human Rights Watch, “You'll Learn Not to Cry: Child Combatants in Colombia,” hrw.org/reports/2003/colombia0903.html, June 22, 2007, 21
8Ibid, 25
9Ibid, 20
10Ibid
11Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.”
12Singer, P.W. “Addressing the Global Challenge of Child Soldiers,” Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, www.dcaf.ch/_docs/Yearbook2005/Chapter6.prf, 117. Last accessed July 5, 2007.
13 Alfreson, Lisa, “Child Soldiers, Displacement and Human Security,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf_art1728.pdf, June 22, 2007.
14Singer, 119
15 Central Intelligence Agency, “Colombia,” The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html, June 26, 2007
Monday, July 2, 2007
People smarter than me agree...
I assume this is the point of the all-important paper literature review? So be it. I promise things will get more interesting after this post. I'll remind you again that I'm still polishing things. Paper is due Sunday--there are many days for fine-tuning.
Donnelly writes of the many tools with which states have pursued human rights goals, including but not limited to investigations, cancellation of ministerial visits, embargoes, withdrawal or increasing of aid, and direct aid to both peaceful and military opposition—but rarely direct military action on behalf of human rights. When U.S. military policy has been addressed in relation to human rights, it is often in the context of either modern day imperialism or abuses carried out by U.S. forces past and present. It can be argued that it it simply not the role of an army tasked with providing national defense to end human rights abuses of foreign governments against their own citizens, as has certainly been the habit of more conservative circles within the United States itself. However, the military has increasingly been given the task of global public relations ambassador on top of national defense, charged with promoting a favorable impression of the U.S. abroad, for example through showing that U.S. troops can “use our combat skills to drop...supplies to those in need” in the aftermath of the tsunami . Recently the Defense Department has been expanding its control over foreign military training programs formerly run by the State Department, moving a former tool of foreign policy out of State's hands and into the pervue of the U.S. military. With arguably the world's largest skilled and highly-trained army, the U.S. is also uniquely positioned to use its military operations for both security protection and the greater good. While he was not explicitly discussing military objections, Donnelly bolsters this point when discussing the unique role of the U.S. in leading by example on the issue of human rights: “On the one hand, America has been seen as a beacon, the proverbial city on a hill, whose human rights mission was to set an example for a corrupt world...On the other hand, the American mission has been seen to require positive action abroad. The United States must teach not simply by its domestic example but by active international involvement on behalf of human rights.”
Recommending the U.S. to use its considerable monetary and international influence to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers in Colombia does is not a prescription that readily lends itself to categorization as a realist, liberal, or constructivist approach to the problem. As described in greater detail in a later section, the U.S. has pressing strategic interests in maintaining its influence in Latin American through Colombia. Therefore, there is “an intrinsic concern for power” that Donnelly writes as being a characteristic of a realist approach . However, a realist would likely see the prioritization of ending human rights abuses in Colombia as a non-central component of U.S. foreign policy in that country, especially when such large military operations and budgets are at play. The Center for International Policy, in a recent report on the increasingly blurring lines between State Department diplomatic programs and Department of Defense programs, writes that historically U.S. policy was often formed in agreement with a realist principle, as the “executive branch generally dislikes the idea of human rights conditionality in the law governing military assistance, since it may disrupt the flow of military aid.”
The case for U.S. involvement in stemming the use of child soldiers is a policy rooted somewhere between the liberal and constructivist schools of thought. Liberals, concerned with absolute gains from cooperation, have trade at the heart of interests in promoting human rights. However, in the case of Colombia and the United States one could argue that the interest is in ending trade—at least in the primary product of trade, narcotics. That said, the U.S. desire to maintain a stronghold of influence in the region, with particular regard to systems of government and social system, could be seen as tied closely to trade interests. The U.S. has already seen what can happen to trade in oil, for example, when a government becomes hostile to the U.S., as is the recent case of Chavez in Venezuela. Finally, constructivists view human rights as powerful forces with the potential to change international politics. Actors, both individual and collective, are shaped by the norms espoused in human rights doctrine. Societal change is possible through the promotion of human rights at all levels. In the case of Colombia, ending the use of child soldiers will break the cycle of violence in the civil conflict, at least in the long-term. Therefore, because of balance of U.S. strategic interests and the hopes for societal change, the policy prescription advanced in this study has its basis in both these schools of thought.
In Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Coorelation, Burke-White advances a theory of “correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct." As a result of this correlation between advancing rights and decreasing aggression, Burke-White recommends that the U.S. adopt a foreign policy informed by human rights so as to enhance its own security. It can be argued that while the risk of aggression on one's own soil is perhaps a nation's most paramount security concern, a state need not attack its neighbor or a far-away rival to pose a security threat. Refugee flows from a conflict-ridden nation across the border to a neighboring state can be equally disruptive. A January 2007 release from the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) described the growing need for refugee processing centers on the Venezuelan border to deal with the increasing number of Colombians seeking security outside their country. According to ReliefNet, a respected resource for humanitarian workers, UNHCR and the Venezuelan government estimate 200,000 Colombians are seeking protection in Venezuela.
Both Burke-White and Robert Dahl advance the theory that democratic states do not abuse the human rights of their citizens. In citing the situation in Lebanon at the time of his piece, Dahl notes that negative impact of long-term conflict on the development of democratic institutions that protect human rights--an observation as relevant to Colombia and its 40 year conflict as to Lebanon.
Donnelly writes of the many tools with which states have pursued human rights goals, including but not limited to investigations, cancellation of ministerial visits, embargoes, withdrawal or increasing of aid, and direct aid to both peaceful and military opposition—but rarely direct military action on behalf of human rights. When U.S. military policy has been addressed in relation to human rights, it is often in the context of either modern day imperialism or abuses carried out by U.S. forces past and present. It can be argued that it it simply not the role of an army tasked with providing national defense to end human rights abuses of foreign governments against their own citizens, as has certainly been the habit of more conservative circles within the United States itself. However, the military has increasingly been given the task of global public relations ambassador on top of national defense, charged with promoting a favorable impression of the U.S. abroad, for example through showing that U.S. troops can “use our combat skills to drop...supplies to those in need” in the aftermath of the tsunami . Recently the Defense Department has been expanding its control over foreign military training programs formerly run by the State Department, moving a former tool of foreign policy out of State's hands and into the pervue of the U.S. military. With arguably the world's largest skilled and highly-trained army, the U.S. is also uniquely positioned to use its military operations for both security protection and the greater good. While he was not explicitly discussing military objections, Donnelly bolsters this point when discussing the unique role of the U.S. in leading by example on the issue of human rights: “On the one hand, America has been seen as a beacon, the proverbial city on a hill, whose human rights mission was to set an example for a corrupt world...On the other hand, the American mission has been seen to require positive action abroad. The United States must teach not simply by its domestic example but by active international involvement on behalf of human rights.”
Recommending the U.S. to use its considerable monetary and international influence to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers in Colombia does is not a prescription that readily lends itself to categorization as a realist, liberal, or constructivist approach to the problem. As described in greater detail in a later section, the U.S. has pressing strategic interests in maintaining its influence in Latin American through Colombia. Therefore, there is “an intrinsic concern for power” that Donnelly writes as being a characteristic of a realist approach . However, a realist would likely see the prioritization of ending human rights abuses in Colombia as a non-central component of U.S. foreign policy in that country, especially when such large military operations and budgets are at play. The Center for International Policy, in a recent report on the increasingly blurring lines between State Department diplomatic programs and Department of Defense programs, writes that historically U.S. policy was often formed in agreement with a realist principle, as the “executive branch generally dislikes the idea of human rights conditionality in the law governing military assistance, since it may disrupt the flow of military aid.”
The case for U.S. involvement in stemming the use of child soldiers is a policy rooted somewhere between the liberal and constructivist schools of thought. Liberals, concerned with absolute gains from cooperation, have trade at the heart of interests in promoting human rights. However, in the case of Colombia and the United States one could argue that the interest is in ending trade—at least in the primary product of trade, narcotics. That said, the U.S. desire to maintain a stronghold of influence in the region, with particular regard to systems of government and social system, could be seen as tied closely to trade interests. The U.S. has already seen what can happen to trade in oil, for example, when a government becomes hostile to the U.S., as is the recent case of Chavez in Venezuela. Finally, constructivists view human rights as powerful forces with the potential to change international politics. Actors, both individual and collective, are shaped by the norms espoused in human rights doctrine. Societal change is possible through the promotion of human rights at all levels. In the case of Colombia, ending the use of child soldiers will break the cycle of violence in the civil conflict, at least in the long-term. Therefore, because of balance of U.S. strategic interests and the hopes for societal change, the policy prescription advanced in this study has its basis in both these schools of thought.
In Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Coorelation, Burke-White advances a theory of “correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct." As a result of this correlation between advancing rights and decreasing aggression, Burke-White recommends that the U.S. adopt a foreign policy informed by human rights so as to enhance its own security. It can be argued that while the risk of aggression on one's own soil is perhaps a nation's most paramount security concern, a state need not attack its neighbor or a far-away rival to pose a security threat. Refugee flows from a conflict-ridden nation across the border to a neighboring state can be equally disruptive. A January 2007 release from the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) described the growing need for refugee processing centers on the Venezuelan border to deal with the increasing number of Colombians seeking security outside their country. According to ReliefNet, a respected resource for humanitarian workers, UNHCR and the Venezuelan government estimate 200,000 Colombians are seeking protection in Venezuela.
Both Burke-White and Robert Dahl advance the theory that democratic states do not abuse the human rights of their citizens. In citing the situation in Lebanon at the time of his piece, Dahl notes that negative impact of long-term conflict on the development of democratic institutions that protect human rights--an observation as relevant to Colombia and its 40 year conflict as to Lebanon.
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